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♣ As in Thoreau's enchanting elegy to the independent thinker, in Walden. He reminded the `conformist' that `If 
a man does not keep pace with his companions', it may well be because `he hears the beat of a different 
drummer.' 
♦ As almost always in my idle speculations, I have been fortified and sustained in these endeavours by the 
enlightened wisdom of my friend and colleague, Stefano Zambelli. He is more wedded to the validity of the 
Church-Turing Thesis than I. I suspect this has to do with age and the increasing awareness of the fragility and 
fallibility of my mind. Unfortunately, I cannot blame him for any of the many remaining infelicities in this 
paper. Abstract1
In this paper I attempt to make a case for promoting the courage of rebels
within the citadels of orthodoxy in academic research environments. Wick-
sell in Macroeconomics, Brouwer in the Foundations of Mathematics,Turing in
Computability Theory, Sra⁄a in the Theories of Value and Distribution are, in
my own ￿elds of research, paradigmatic examples of rebels, adventurers and
non-conformists of the highest calibre in scienti￿c research within University
environments. In what sense, and how, can such rebels, adventurers and non-
conformists be fostered in the current University research environment domi-
nated by the cult of ￿ picking winners￿? This is the motivational question lying
behind the historical outlines of the work of Wicksell, Brouwer, Hilbert, Bishop,
Veronese, G￿del, Turing and Sra⁄a that I describe in this paper. The debate
between freedom in research and teaching and the naked imposition of ￿ cor-
rect￿thinking, on potential dissenters of the mind, is of serious concern in this
age of austerity of material facilities. It is a debate that has occupied some the
￿nest minds working at the deepest levels of foundational issues in mathematics,
metamathematics and economic theory. By making some of the issues explicit,
I hope it is possible to encourage dissenters to remain courageous in the face of
current dogmas.
Keywords: Non-conformist research, macroeconomics, foundations of math-
ematics, intuitionism, constructivism, formalism, ￿ Hilbert￿ s Dogma￿ , Hilbert￿ s
Program, computability theory
1I aimed to ￿nish the ￿rst draft of this paper on the 15th of October, the 82nd anniversary
of Hilbert￿ s unfortunate letter to Einstein, seeking support to dismiss Brouwer from the edito-
rial board of Mathematische Annalen ([65], pp. 602-3). Hilbert failed to enlist Einstein￿ s
support. In any case, this is a very preliminary draft report of an ongoing research project
on ￿ freedom in research and teaching in academic environments￿ . The aim is to study the
evolution of the debates in the foundations of mathematics ￿metamathematics ￿and nonlin-
ear dynamics in the past century and a quarter and try to learn lessons about the way these
subjects have in￿uenced the mathematization of economics.
21 ￿ The permanent bottleneck of his highmind-
edness.....2￿
"You have not converted a man because you have silenced him."
Viscount Morley, On Compromise, 1874.
Brouwer was silenced by Hilbert3, but refused to be converted from Intu-
itionism; Bishop was silenced, but continued his courageous task of refounding
much of classical mathematics on constructive grounds; Wicksell was repeatedly
thwarted from a permanent academic post, but did not turn away from voicing
his rebellious opinions on every available platform; ￿ to keep Senator McCarthy
o⁄his back￿ , Paul Samuelson, no less, had to coin a pointless phrase, the neoclas-
sical synthesis, which took an orthodox life of its own to subvert the Keynesian
revolution4; Sra⁄a￿ s rigorous ￿ yet elegant ￿ prose was silenced by mindless
mathematical economists, yet he was not converted, even though he remained
(largely) silent in the face of repeated misrepresentations of his economics and
his mathematics; Dirac￿ s delta function was ￿ silenced￿by von Neumann, in the
name of mathematical rigour, yet did not succeed in preventing its ultimate
success, exactly on the grounds of mathematical rigour; Veronese￿ s valiant at-
tempt to develop a non-Archimedean theory of the in￿nitesimal was silenced by
his great contemporary, Giuseppe Peano, supporting Cantor and supported by
Russell, yet ￿half-a-century later - it was the Veronese who was vindicated.
The examples can be multiplied in all sorts of ways.
In every case, orthodoxy and conformism triumphed - albeit in the short-
run; the visionaries triumphed, eventually, mostly after their time, but not
always. The hallmark of each example of orthodoxy￿ s apostles ruthlessly silenc-
ing heretics was the unbending, un￿ inching, conviction with which the o¢ cial
heretics held their visions, and refused to be converted, even if their temporary
silences ￿in the face of the triumphal noise made by the ostensible silencers ￿
may have been construed as a conversion.
2The last line of Louis MacNeice￿ s thoughtful, soft, tribute to the honest intellectual,
Bottleneck. The poem begins unambiguously, by stating the credo of the honest intellectual:
￿ Never to ￿ght unless from a pure motive, And for a clear end was his unwritten rule.￿ The
closing lines, inevitably are: ￿ For compromise with fact, longing to be combined, Into a working
whole but cannot jostle through, The permanent bottleneck of his highmindedness.￿
3As noted by van Dalen, in his superbly fair and detailed outline of the ￿ The Crisis of the
Mathematische Annalen￿ , when Hilbert resorted to every possible means ￿both fair and foul
￿to remove Brouwer from its editorial board, [63], p. 31:
"After the Annalen a⁄air, little zest for the propagation of intuitionism was
left in Brouwer; .. .. Actually, his whole mathematical activity became rather
marginal for a prolonged period."
4In his unpublished ￿ Perugia Lectures￿ , Robert Clower confessed that he had taken it for
granted for several years that there was some kind of analytical content in the neo-classical
synthesis. ￿Oh, not at all￿, said Paul Samuelson, ￿don￿ t you remember what was happening
in those years?￿And I said ￿no￿. ￿Well, McCarthy was after me and I put in the neo-classical
synthesis and suggested that it was just a matter of point of view in order to get him o⁄ my
back￿. And I said ￿You mean that you actually invented this term for those reasons?￿
3What does it take to hold on to a vision, against the teeth of every kind
of subversion to which orthodoxy will resort to, not excluding personal attacks
camou￿ aged in the veneer of professional pomposity? In the absence of institu-
tional support, increasingly at a premium, when even the hallowed independence
of Universities is being pawned at the altar of orthodox funding criteria, dom-
inated by the cult of ￿ picking winners￿on the basis of absurd and ahistorical
criteria, the only way of sustaining an unorthodox vision is to have the courage
to remain the ￿ unrewarded amateurish conscience￿of the intellectual world, in
the sense made wonderfully clear by Edward Said in his Fourth BBC-Sponsored
Reith Lecture (The Independent, 15 July, 1993):
"Every intellectual has an audience and a constituency. The
issue is whether that audience is there to be satis￿ed, and hence
a client to be kept happy, or whether it is there to be challenged,
and hence stirred into outright opposition, or mobilised into greater
democratic participation in the society. But in either case, there is
no getting around the intellectuals relationship to them. How does
the intellectual address authority: as a professional supplicant, or as
its unrewarded, amateurish conscience?"
Brouwer and Bishop, Veronese and Levi-Civitta, Wicksell and Sra⁄a, G￿del
and Turing, Dirac and Samuelson, had the courage to be ￿ authority￿ s unre-
warded, amateurish conscience￿ . It is this that we need to make clear to the
young, idealistic, enquiring, fresh minds that enter our Universities with hopes
and expectations of unbiased education, intellectual adventure and a path to-
wards the frontiers of research, without too many compromises to authority ￿
of whatever form.
With these aims in mind the paper is structured as follows. In the next
section, a kind of succinct statement of the credo I want to subscribe to, is
outlined. In section 3, very brie￿ y and, perhaps, somewhat romantically, I try
to outline the broad aim of the paper through a very brief summary of an aspect
of the special story of Knut Wicksell and the courageous way he pursued his
focused research agenda, despite coordinated actions to prevent him from doing
so ￿ most blatantly by denying him access to any kind of secure University
appointment, till very late in his life.
The paper￿ s main focus, however, is to discuss, via, the way the a particular
vision of the foundations and the practice of mathematics was systematically
subverted on non-scienti￿c grounds, the way an orthodoxy in any one epoch
tried to act as censorious Commissars on what is right and what is proper in
mathematical activity; but also to go beyond and do their utmost to banish any-
thing that smacked of an alternative vision ￿usually by appealing to unde￿ned
notions of ￿ rigour￿ , but not always. Every kind of pressure was brought to bear
on alternative visions and to subvert them and make it impossible for the alter-
native visionaries to get a hearing via the ordinary channels of communication.
This issue is discussed in section 4. The penultimate section is a simple story
of the kind of unintended consequences of free thinking that could undermine
4even the most meticulously devised systems of foresight. The concluding section
summarizes the lessons in the form of speculative re￿ ections.
2 ￿ Oh! What a Tangled Web We Weave ...5
"I sought a theme and sort for it in vain,
I sought it daily for six weeks or so.
......
What can I but enumerate old themes ...
William Butler Yeats: The Circus Animals￿Desertion
Intellectual history is replete with claims of complete solutions, de￿nitive
codi￿cations, unambiguous ￿ ￿nal￿resolutions of paradoxes, almost all and every
one of which have turned out to be illusory. I want to state three such ex-
amples, just to place the idea of eternal vigilance against this dogma of ￿ ￿nal
solutions￿ , but also to suggest that visionaries with conviction should persevere,
even against the most formidable odds, particularly in intellectual contexts.
Their time will come, perhaps too late for them to savour, but posterity has a
way of resurrecting vintage ideas, rather like the way great wines mature with
grace and evolve into silken tastes.
In the context of the issues treated in this paper the most signi￿cant example
is the obituary of the ￿ paradoxes￿ of the in￿nitesimals, the in￿nite and the
continuum, announced by no less an authority than Bertrand Russell, [14], pp.
1-2 (bold emphasis, added):
"In his paper Recent Work On The Principles of Mathematics, which
appeared in 1901, Bertrand Russell reported that the three central
problems of traditional mathematical philosophy ￿the nature of the
in￿nite, the nature of the in￿nitesimal, and the nature of the con-
tinuum ￿had all been ￿ completely solved￿. ... Indeed, as Russell
went on to add: ￿ The solutions, for those acquainted with mathemat-
ics, are so clear as to leave no longer the slightest doubt or di¢ culty￿
... . According to Russell, the structure of the in￿nite and the con-
tinuum were completely revealed by Cantor and Dedekind, and
the concept of an in￿nitesimal had been found to incoherent and was
￿ banish[ed] from mathematics￿through the work of Weierstrass
and others6."
5.. When ￿rst we practise to deceive￿ , in: Marmion, Canto VI, stanza 17, by Sir Walter
Scott.
6In [47], p. 337 (italics added), Russell is equally merciless in dismissing any role for the
in￿nitesimal in mathematics (not just in mathematical philosophy):
"[W]e may, I think, conclude that these in￿nitesimals are mathematical ￿ctions."
Now, a little over a century after Russell￿ s initial obituaries, the in￿nitesimal, the in￿nite
and the continuum are very much alive, well and even routinely applied in economics, too!
5Theological excommunications, intolerant arrogance, are some phrases that
come to mind, when reading these premature obituaries. Why do even advocates
of liberal, tolerant, attitudes to public life and sociological attitudes become
intolerant in the purely intellectual domain?
My two other examples refer to equally celebrated but, mercifully, even more
immediately falsi￿ed prophetic ponti￿cations by two almost saintly intellectual
giants of the 19th century: Lord Kelvin and John Stuart Mill. The former is
reputed to have suggested, on the eve of the works by Planck and Einstein that
changed the intellectual map of the natural scientist as a physicist, that all the
problems of physics had been solved : ￿ except for just two anomalies: that of the
Michelson-Morley experiment, on the one hand, and Black Body radiation on
the other￿! The one led to the relativistic revolution; the other to the quantum
intellectual cataclysms7.
As for the great and saintly John Stuart Mill, in what can only be called
an unfortunate moment of weakness, he etched for posterity these (in)-famously
un-prophetic thoughts on the ￿ end of the theory of value￿ , [33], Bk. III, Ch. I.,
p. 266; italics added:
"Happily, there is nothing in the laws of Value which remains for the
present writer to clear up; the theory of the subject is complete: the
only di¢ culty to be overcome is that of so stating it as to solve by
anticipation the chief perplexities which occur in applying it: and to
do this, some minuteness of exposition, and considerable demands
on the patience of the reader, are inevitable.￿
These words were coined on the eve of Marx￿ s great and revolutionary works
and not many years before the even more signi￿cant marginal revolutions in
value theory.
Research and intellectual adventures can and must always be open-ended
and the institutions that underpin open-ended research have, themselves, to
be founded on structures with ￿ exibilities ￿rather like the way Herbert Simon
advocated organisations to be semi-decomposable so as to facilitate evolution.
I cannot do better than to recall ￿ and re-record ￿ the kind of attitude to
research that I grew up with, the kind of approach to research that was fostered
by my own Cambridge maestro, Richard Goodwin, as reported, with ￿rst-hand
experience, by one of his own most illustrious students, the Nobel Laureate
Robert Solow, [56], pp. 32-3 (italics added) :
￿There was something more important, however. It is clear in my
mind that when I asked what I must have thought were devilishly
Most of the frontier mathematical models in macroeconomic theory are based on variables
de￿ned on the continuum; or, it is claimed that the most rigorous way to model a competitive
economy, with price taking behaviour, should be on the basis of non-standard analysis.
7The actual statement, made in an address to an assemblage of physicists at the British
Association for the advancement of Science in 1900, seems to have been: "There is
nothing new to be discovered in physics now. All that remains is more and more precise
measurement."
6clever or profound questions, Mr Goodwin did not take a high and
mighty ￿and defensive ￿line. His answers made it plain that he had
plenty of sceptical doubts of his own. I may be inventing this, but I
seem to recall that he sometimes suggested that, well, one could not
actually believe this or that, but it was an ingenious line of thought,
perhaps worth following just to see where it came out. Once could
always reject it later, and then one would have a better idea of what
one was rejecting. If that actually happened, then I was getting my
introduction to the theorist￿ s frame of mind.
....
...I continued to learn from [Goodwin], both in the substance
of economic theory .... and in a more subtle way that I do not
know how to describe except as a matter of intellectual style. The
unspoken language was that if a thing is worth doing it is worth
doing playfully. Do not misunderstand me: ￿ playful￿does not mean
￿ frivolous￿or ￿ unserious￿ . It means, rather, that one should follow a
trail the way a puppy does, sni¢ ng the ground, wagging one￿ s tail,
and barking a lot, because it smells interesting and it would be fun
to see where it goes.￿
I am convinced that this spirit of enlightened ￿ playfulness￿in research is being
discouraged in the current intellectual environments of research institutions,
plagued and harassed as they are with pressures to produce results that are
measurable in the marketplace, as if ideas can be produced without speculations,
failures and traumas.
Moreover, even while espousing the virtues of globalisation of the market for
goods and services in the conventional sense, academic institutions ￿in partic-
ular ￿are increasingly parochial in the way they are administered, hoping to
outline strategies to ￿ pick winners￿ , nationally, and out-compete other nations
in the so-called market-place for ideas and their immediate application for mon-
etary rewards. Crass cost-bene￿t analysis, without the slightest understanding
of the kind of assumptions required for such methods to make serious sense,
motivates evaluations and ordinary promotions.
Moreover, the ahistorical notion that ideas can be generated and evolve in
an environment simulating the competitive market model is at least doubly non-
sensical: ￿rstly, because the formalization of the competitive market model is
seriously de￿cient in its mathematical underpinnings, especially with respect
to numerical meaning in the presence of any kind of ￿ scale e⁄ects￿ ; secondly,
the implicit assumption that ideas that have been outcompeted are de￿nitively
hollowed-out. History does not provide any substantiation of this blinkered vi-
sion. The mania for claiming completeness of theories, thereby also banishing
from discourse possible alternatives, permeates intellectual history in all its do-
mains. That it is even signi￿cantly present in the purest recesses of mathematics
and its foundations is somewhat more surprising than its presence in a subject
infused with ideological over ￿and under ￿tones, such as economics.
73 Dante and Thorild at The Gate of Silence8
"And the preacher wept,
Because that he himself, being born of man,
Dreamed dreams,
And because the great dreams, the mighty visions, the noble
fantasies,
The great illusions that had made man great,
Were now over-past, thrown down, ruined, fallen."
W. T. Stace, ([58]), The Temptation in the Desert, p. 31
At the graduate school of economics to which I am a¢ liated, in the depart-
ment of economics at the University of Trento, graduate students ￿and young
non-tenured researchers ￿are encouraged, even admonished, to pursue lines of
research that do not deviate from orthodoxy, ￿ to ￿sh only in well ￿shed waters￿ ,
as it is uncompromisingly, and repeatedly, stated. Second, there is the utterly
deplorable preoccupation to evaluate the performance of colleagues in terms of
criteria that deaden any adventures in intellectual exploration. This is imple-
mented, in criteria for promotion, for example, by the accumulation of ￿ brownie
points￿for publication in o¢ cially ￿ highly rated￿journals, as classed by one or
another bibliometric criterion. These two criteria ￿to ￿sh only in well-￿shed
waters and to aim to publish only in o¢ cially sanctioned journals ￿encourage
a culture of conservatism that makes it very di¢ cult for young minds, even
if they had intrinsic propensities to do so, to explore all but the well-trodden
path of research. Eventually, ￿shing in well-￿shed waters will only lead to an
exhaustion of supply and, then, one has to stock arti￿cial lakes and cordoned o⁄
portions of the sea with ￿sh, so that would-be ￿shermen and ￿sher-women are
able to simulate the sensation of being natural versions of the once adventurous
profession.
An example of particular relevance for the theme and content of this paper
may highlight the problem. The article that initiated, and even provided the
encapsulating name for, the Grundlagenkrise in mathematics, during the decade
of the 1920s, was Hermann Weyl￿ s classic: ￿ber die neue Grundlagenkrise der
Mathematik ([77]). This was not published in the leading Mathematical Journal
￿at least in Continental Europe ￿of the time, Mathematische Annalen (MA),
in spite of the fact that Weyl was, at that time, still very close to Hilbert,
the main editor of MA. Hesseling, in his admirably exhaustive study of the
Grundlagenkrise conjectures, I think correctly, ￿ that Weyl wanted to speak freely￿
([22], p. 132). Naturally, this conjecture, if correct, presupposes that Hilbert
would have acted as a censoring Commissar, and not as an impartial editor,
8The Gate of Silence ([58]) is the title of a book of poems by W.T. Stace, written
during his later Princeton years as a Professor Philosophy, but re￿ecting on his earlier years
as a colonial civil servant in old Ceylon, where he was a dedicated scholar of Buddhist and
Hindu philosophy. W.T. Stace was the undergraduate thesis supervisor of the distinguished
philosopher of law and justice, John Rawls.
8contrary to Felix Klein￿ s original aims for the Mathematische Annalen to be an
outlet for alternative views and visions of Mathematics and its foundations9.
Essentially, ￿ Weyl wanted to speak freely￿ , but may have feared that ￿ Hilbert
would have wanted him to speak correctly￿ , and chose ￿since he could - the
former alternative. How many young researchers, in today￿ s environment, are
straitjacketed and frog-marched into ￿ speaking correctly￿ , by being forced to
collect brownie points for publishing in o¢ cially rated Journals, than thinking
freely and expressing fresh and original thoughts, unencumbered by the shackles
of orthodoxy￿ s censorious Commissars, who hide behind the mantra of ￿ peer
reviewing￿?
The point I wish to make is no better illustrated than a seemingly amusing
episode in the life of one of the great original thinkers in economic theory,
Knut Wicksell. a gad￿ y to every purveyor of orthodoxy if ever there was one,
although, by now, his work and personality have been diluted and distorted
to such an extent that he is even considered a precursor of macroeconomic
orthodoxy.
With great reluctance10, he applied for exemptions from certain archaic reg-
ulations that prevented him from seeking teaching posts ￿ as a Docent ￿ in
Faculties of Humanities; they were all rejected. He, then, applied for a similar
post in the Law and Philosophy Faculties at the University of Uppsala, with
predictable rejections. It was widely known that the rejections had more to
do with Wicksell￿ s ￿ politically incorrect￿opinions ￿as we would now refer to
them, perjoratively ￿and his way of expressing them, than with any scienti￿c
objections to his work (cf, [20], in particular, pp. 185-6)11.
It is against this highly stylised summary of the background to the series of
rejections the great Wicksell experienced, that was, nevertheless, symptomatic
of o¢ cial stances then ￿and even now, although stated and held with more
apparent ￿nesse ￿that one must try to interpret G￿rdlund￿ s genuine attempt
to give content to the obduracy and shenanigans of orthodoxy against a ￿ercely
independent scholar of impeccable integrity. He ￿G￿rdlund ￿did so with ad-
mirable clarity, simplicity and brevity, by using a famous, though melancholy,
cartoon, which was underpinned by a deep sense of the futility of free-thinking
and the inevitability of the dominance of the deadening forces of conformism.
9In many and precisely documentable ways, it will not be an exaggeration to say that Weyl￿ s
unexpected conversion to a version of intuitionism and constructive mathematics ￿especially
in his advocacy of impredicativism ￿set the stage for the initiation of the Grundlagenkrise
of the 1920s. Even more than Brouwer￿ s own fundamental contributions, it may have been
Weyl￿ s famous book on Das Kontinuum ([75]), and his two subsequent articles, [76] and [77],
that set the tone and themes, at least in the ￿rst instance, for the Grundlagenkrise. If not
anything else, at least the two phrases that became common currency in the debates, were
coined by Weyl in the above book and articles: Der circulus vitiosus and Grundlagenkrise.
10Because it may imply ￿ compromises with enemies in the ￿ght for truth and justice￿ , [20],
p.182, Wicksell was reluctant to apply for conventional or o¢ cial positions.
11By this time, Wicksell was the author of two of the great classics of capital theory and
public ￿nance, respectively ￿ and was well on the way to completing the de￿ning work of
Monetary Theory that set the stage for the emergence of a revolutionary Macroeconomics
([78], [79], [80] and [81]).
9Figure 1: Wicksell at the Entrance to the University of Uppsala
In his magisterial biography of Knut Wicksell12, Torsten G￿rdlund repro-
duces the following sketch (see Fig. 1) by Edward Forsstr￿m, which had ￿rst
appeared in the Swedish satirically humorous magazine S￿ndags-Nisse (1862-
1924), in 1896:
The caption above, in Fig. 1, states: ￿ Wicksell at the Portal of the Uni-
versity￿ . The caption below, in Fig. 1, has Cerberus admonishing Wicksell,
on his appointment as a Docent in the Law Faculty of the University of Upp-
sala13: ￿ You, who will enter [through these gates], give up all hope, since thou
12Subtitled REBELL I DET NYA RIKET ([20]), The ￿ Nya Riket￿ is a reference to
the culturally, socially, scienti￿cally and politically emerging modernism that was enveloping
Sweden, despite its continuing economic backwardness, of the late 19th and early 20th century.
13Cereberus is the three-headed hound, in Greek and Roman mythology, guarding the Gates
of Hades from those who have crossed the river Styx, demarcating the bounds between the
10Figure 2: Thomas Torild￿ s 1794 Aphorism
shall know that freedom in thinking is important, but correct thinking is more
important￿ . The phrase on the walls of the arched entrance, guarded by the
caricatured three-headed Cereberus, is given in Fig. 2, as a photograph on the
actual wall of the Aula at Uppsala University.
Obviously, Cereberus invokes Dante￿ s famous admonishment in the Inferno:
￿ Lasciate ogni speranza , voi ch￿ entrate￿ , on the one hand, and the tragic ￿but
noble ￿ words of Thomas Thorild14, a courageous poet, philosopher and an
advocate of press freedom and gender equality. He was subsequently exiled for
these punishable beliefs, when expressed in public, in 1793. He never returned
to mainland Sweden, after the being exiled, ending his days in Greifswald, then
part of Swedish Pomerania. Wicksell did not bend, did not give up hope, did
not compromise with his passion for truth and for trying to reach it ￿whatever
he may have conceived it to be ￿ with a sense of freedom of thought, and
he persisted against all odds and eventually triumphed, but mostly after his
lifetime. Sadly, these aspects of his struggles to forge a macroeconomic theory,
challenging orthodox monetary theory and its sanguine methodology of stable
equilibria, have been submerged to the dusty heaps of works by arcane scholars
Earth and the underworld. My own background in Hindu mythology enables me to recall
Yaman ￿ the god of death ￿ and his two guard dogs, Sarvara, sometimes referred to as
providing the origins of the word Cereberus, or as in Hesiod, ￿￿ "￿￿"￿o& (Kerberos).
14The Thorild aphorism, in the original Swedish is:
"T￿nka Fritt ￿r Stort
Men T￿nka R￿tt ￿r St￿rre."
My (free) translation would be:
"Freedom in thinking is important;
But correct thinking is more important."
11of the history of economic thought. They should be part of the study of the
sociology of academic politics, so that every generation renews itself and inspires
itself by a knowledge of the nobility of Wicksell￿ s integrity.
4 Brouwer (and Bishop) ￿Towards the Grund-
lagenkrise (and its Perennial Resurrections)
"It may be remarked here that Hilbert was too pessimistic about
a Tertium non datur-free mathematics. Work in the intuitionistic
school and above all the results of the school of Errett Bishop gave a
powerful impetus to constructive mathematics by actually rebuilding
large parts of analysis in a constructive manner."
Dirk van Dalen, [65], p. 576; italics added.
There have been many foundational crises in mathematics, but the one we
refer to here as the Grundlagenkrise is that which was associated almost exclu-
sively with the debate surrounding the positions taken by the two protagonists
for two foundational views on Mathematics: Hilbert and Brouwer, and which
blossomed and then wilted in acrimony of the most unexpectedly personal sort,
during the whole of the 1920s, reaching a kind of climax in 1928. As mentioned
above, it may have said to have crystallized and been initiated by the explicit
stance taken by Weyl, and stated clearly in his three foundational works be-
tween 1918 ￿1921 (cf. [75], [76] and [77]). Weyl￿ s stance was somewhere in
between the pure intuitionism of Brouwer and the ￿nitist formalism of Hilbert,
although much closer in philosophical adherence to the former than the latter,
despite the fact that he was one of the latter￿ s outstanding direct pupils. Weyl￿ s
intuitionism was closer in spirit to PoincarØ￿ s impredicativism, later taken up
with great ￿nesse by Solomon Feferman ([17]).
In subsection 2, below, I try to outline the main issues that characterised
the formal issues in the Grundlagenkrise. Here I want to place on record, in
the context of the aims and themes of this paper ￿freedom from dogma and
coercion in research thinking and activity, in the academic world ￿two exam-
ples of intolerance, that continue to bedevil research of the most fundamental
sort. If even pure foundational research is subject to such dogmatic pressures
of intolerance what hope is there for applied subjects that are closer to social
and political sensitivities?
Both Brouwer and Bishop, separated by forty years between the beginning of
the end of the Grundlagenkrise in October 1928 and the publication of Bishop￿ s
classic Foundations of Constructive Analysis, in 1967 ([2]) su⁄ered remarkably
similar fates: the orthodox mathematician￿ s indiscriminate victimization of al-
ternative visions of the foundations of mathematics. This was partly due to
the way the mathematicians misunderstood ￿or simply were ignorant of ￿the
way Brouwer and Bishop tried to develop an intuitive mathematics, entirely
consistent with the practice of the applied mathematician, without any reliance
on, or appeal to, mathematical logic. Their￿ s was a fate and a drama that
12was reenacting that which was played at the turn of the 19th century, into the
20th, between Cantor and Veronese, with Peano ￿rmly on Cantor￿ s side, on the
way in￿nitesimals were to be considered in the foundations of the real number
system and on non-Archimedean systems, in general. Ostensibly, Cantor won
the intellectual battle, but only ￿ temporarily￿ ; Veronese was vindicated,but only
more than half-a-century later, after Abraham Robinson, Detlef Laugwitz, Paul
Lorenzen, Jerome Keisler and others rejuvenated research into non-standard
analysis in a systematic way to place in￿nitesimals on ￿rm logical foundations.
4.1 Hilbert￿ s Dogma, ￿ ￿ consistency , existence￿￿Be-
comes the Mathematical Economist￿ s Credo
"It is worth noting that in later stages of his career, he became
the most forceful proponent of the so-called intuitionist philosophy
of mathematics, which not only forbids the use of the Axiom of
Choice but also rejects the axiom that a proposition is either true
or false (thereby disallowing the method of proof by contradiction).
The consequences of taking this position are dire. For instance, an
intuitionist would not accept the existence of an irrational number!
In fact, in his later years, Brouwer did not view the Brouwer Fixed
Point Theorem as a theorem. (he had proved this result in 1912,
when he was functioning as a ￿ standard￿mathematician).
If you want to learn about intuitionism in mathematics, I suggest
reading ￿in your spare time, please ￿the four articles by Heyting
and Brouwer in Benacerraf and Putnam (1983)."
Efe. A. Ok ([39], p. 279; italics added.
Unfortunately, the beginning of the end of the Grundlagenkrise coincided
almost exactly with the re-birth of mathematical economics, in a precise, and
precisely datable, sense. The von Neumann paper of 1928 ([73]), introduced,
and etched indelibly, to an unsuspecting and essentially non-existent Math-
ematical Economics community and tradition what has eventually come to
be called ￿ Hilbert￿ s Dogma￿ 15, ￿ consistency , existence￿ . This became ￿and
largely remains ￿the mathematical economist￿ s credo. Hence, too, the inevitable
schizophrenia of ￿ proving￿existence of equilibria, ￿rst, and looking for methods
to construct them at a second, entirely unconnected, stage. Thus, too, the indis-
criminate appeals to the tertium non datur ￿and its implications ￿in ￿ existence
proofs￿ , on the one hand, and the ignorance about the nature and foundations
of constructive mathematics, on the other.
15In van Dalen￿ s measured, studied, scholarly, opinion, [65], pp. 576-7 (italics added):
"Since Hilbert￿ s yardstick was calibrated by the continuum hypothesis, Hilbert￿ s
dogma, ￿ consistency , existence￿ , and the like, he was by de￿nition right. But
if one is willing to allow other yardsticks, no less signi￿cant, but based on
alternative principles, then Brouwer￿ s work could not be written o⁄ as obsolete
nineteenth century stu⁄."
13But it was not as if von Neumann was not aware of Brouwer￿ s opposition
to ￿ Hilbert￿ s Dogma￿ , even at that early stage, although there is reason to sus-
pect ￿ given the kind of theme I am trying to develop in this paper ￿ that
something peculiarly ￿ subversive￿was going on. Hugo Steinhaus observed, with
considerable perplexity, [59]:
"[My] inability [to prove the minimax theorem] was a consequence of
the ignorance of Zermelo￿ s paper in spite of its having been published
in 1913. .... J von Neumann was aware of the importance of the
minimax principle [in [73]]; it is, however, di¢ cult to understand the
absence of a quotation of Zermelo￿ s lecture in his publications."
ibid, p. 460; italics added
Why didn￿ t von Neumann refer, in 1928, to the Zermelo-tradition of (alter-
nating) games? van Dalen, in his comprehensive, eminently readable, scrupu-
lously fair and technically and conceptually thoroughly competent biography of
Brouwer, [65], p. 636, noted (italics added), without additional comment that16:
"In 1929 there was another publication in the intuitionistic tradi-
tion: an intuitionistic analysis of the game of chess by Max Euwe17.
It was a paper in which the game was viewed as a spread (i.e., a
tree with the various positions as nodes). Euwe carried out precise
constructive estimates of various classes of games, and considered
the in￿ uence of the rules for draws. When he wrote his paper he
was not aware of the earlier literature of Zermelo and DØnŁs K￿nig.
Von Neumann called his attention to these papers, and in a letter to
Browuer von Neumann sketched a classical approach to the mathe-
matics of chess, pointing out that it could easily be constructivized."
Why didn￿ t von Neumann provide this ￿ easily constructivized￿approach ￿
then, or later? Perhaps it was easier to derive propositions appealing to the
tertium non datur, and to ￿ Hilbert￿ s Dogma￿ , than to do the hard work of
constructing estimates of an algorithmic solution, as Euwe did? Perhaps it was
easier to continue using the axiom of choice that to construct new axioms ￿say
16At the end of his paper Euwe reports that von Neumann brought to his attention the
works by Zermelo and Konig, after he had completed his own work (ibid, p. 641). Euwe then
goes on (italics added):
"Der gegebene Beweis is aber nicht konstruktive, d.h. es wird keine Methode
angezeigt, mit Hilfe deren der gewinnweg, wenn ￿berhaupt m￿glich, in endlicher
Zeit konstruiert werden kann."
17In a strange lapse, van Dalen refers to Euwe, 1929, without giving the exact details of
the reference in his excellent bibliography! The exact reference is [15]. Max Euwe was the
￿fth World Chess Champion, between 1935-1937, having defeated Alexander Alekhine, on
December 15, 1935.
14the axiom of determinacy18 ￿as Steinhaus and Mycielski did ([34])? Whatever
the reason, the fact remains that the von Neumann legacy was indisputably a
legitimization of ￿ Hilbert￿ s Dogma￿and the indiscriminate use of the axiom of
choice in mathematical economics.
It is against such a background that one must read, and not be surprised, at
the kind of preposterously ignorant and false assertions in Ok￿ s above observa-
tions and claims. These are made in a new advanced text book on mathematics
for graduate (economic) students, published under the imprint of an outstanding
publishing house ￿Princeton University Press ￿and peddled as a text treating
the material it does contain ￿ rigorously￿(although the student is not warned
that there are many yardsticks of ￿ rigour￿and that which is asserted to be ￿ rig-
orous￿in one kind of mathematics could be considered ￿ ￿ ippant￿and slippery￿
in another kind (see van Dalen￿ s point in the previous footnote).
Yet, every one of the assertions in the above quote is false, and also severely
misleading. Brouwer did not ￿ become the most forceful proponent of the so-
called intuitionist philosophy of mathematics in later stages of his career￿ ; he
was an intuitionist long before he formulated and proved what came, later, to
be called the Brouwer Fix-Point theorem (cf. [4]19, [5] and [6]); for the record,
even the ￿xed-point theorem came earlier than 1912. It is nonsensical to claim
that Brouwer did not consider ￿ Fixed Point Theorem as a theorem￿ ; he did not
consider it a valid theorem in intuitionistic constructive mathematics, and he had
a very cogent reason for it, which was stated with admirable and crystal clarity
when he ￿nally formulated and proved it, forty years later, within intuitionistic
constructive mathematics ([7]). On that occasion he identi￿ed the reason why
his original theorem was unacceptable in intuitionistic constructive ￿indeed,
in almost any kind of constructive ￿mathematics, for example, in Bishop-style
constructivism, which was developed without any reliance on a philosophy of
intuitionism:
18For the aims of this paper, the introduction of this axiom is particularly relevant. The
point I wish to make is best described in Gaisi Takeuti￿ s important observation ([60], pp. 73-4;
italics added):
"There has been an idea, which was originally claimed by G￿del and others,
that, if one added an axiom which is a strengthened version of the existence of a
measurable cardinal to existing axiomatic set theory, then various mathematical
problems might all be resolved. Theoretically, nobody would oppose such an
idea, but, in reality, most set theorists felt it was a fairy tale and it would never
really happen. But it has been realized by virtue of the axiom of determinateness,
which showed G￿del￿ s idea valid."
19Brouwer could not have been clearer on this point, when he wrote, in his 1907 Thesis
(ibid:, p. 45; bold emphasis, added):
"[T]he continuum as a whole was given to us by intuition; a construction
for it, an action which would create from the mathematical intuition ￿ all￿its
points as individuals, is inconceivable and impossible.
The mathematical intuition is unable to create other than denumerable sets of
individuals."
15"[T]he validity of the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem [in intuition-
ism] would make the classical and the intuitionist form of ￿xed-point
theorems equivalent." ([7], p.1).
Note how Brouwer refers to a ￿ classical ... form of the ￿xed-point theorem￿ .
The invalidity of the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem20 in any form of construc-
tivism is due to its reliance on the law of the excluded middle21 in an in￿nitary
context of choices (cf. also [13], pp. 10-12). The part that invokes the Bolzano-
Weierstrass theorem entails undecidable disjunctions and as long as any proof
invokes this property, it will remain unconstructi￿able.
It is worse than nonsense ￿if such a thing is conceivable ￿to state that ￿ an
intuitionist would not accept the existence of an irrational number￿ . Moreover,
the law of the excluded middle is not a mathematical axiom; it is a logical law,
accepted even by the intuitionists so long as meaningless ￿precisely de￿ned ￿in-
￿nities are not being considered as alternatives from which to ￿ choose￿ 22. This is
especially to be remembered in any context involving intuitionism, particularly
in its Brouwerian variants, since he ￿more than anyone else, with the possible
exception of Wittgenstein ￿insisted on the independence of mathematics from
logic. In Brouwer￿ s enunciation of the famous ￿rst act of intuitionism (cf. [8]),
there is the uncompromising requirement for constructive mathematics to be
independent of ￿ theoretical logic￿and to be ￿ languageless￿ :
"FIRST ACT OF INTUITIONISM Completely separating math-
ematics from mathematical language and hence from the phenomena
of language described by theoretical logic, recognizing that intuition-
istic mathematics is an essentially languageless activity of the mind
having its origin in the perception of a move of time."
ibid, p.4; italics added.
As for the un￿nessed remark about the axiom of choice being forbidden,
the author should have been much more careful. Had this author done his ele-
mentary mathematical homework properly, Bishop￿ s deep and thoughtful clar-
i￿cations of the role of a choice axiom in varieties of mathematics may have
prevented the appearance of such nonsense, [2], p.9:
20For the absolute novice, I state here the simplest possible statement of this theorem:
Bolzano-Weierstrass Theorem: Every bounded sequence contains a con-
vergent subsequence
21Tertium Non Datur.
22Even as early as in 1908, we ￿nd Brouwer dealing with this issue with exceptional clarity
(cf., [6], pp. 109-110; bold emphasis, added):
"Now consider the principium tertii exclusi: It claims that every supposition is
either true or false; ...
Insofar as only ￿nite discrete systems are introduced, the investigation
whether an imbedding is possible or not, can always be carried out and admits a
de￿nite result, so in this case the principium tertii exclusi is reliable as a principle
of reasoning.
[I]n in￿nite systems the principium tertii exclusi is as yet not reliable."
16"When a classical mathematician claims he is a constructivist, he
probably means he avoids the axiom of choice. This axiom is unique
in its ability to trouble the conscience of the classical mathematician,
but in fact it is not a real source of the unconstructivities of classical
mathematics. A choice function exists in constructive mathematics,
because a choice is implied by the very meaning of existence23. Ap-
plications of the axiom of choice in classical mathematics either are
irrelevant or are combined with a sweeping appeal to the principle
of omniscience24. The axiom of choice is used to extract elements
from equivalence classes where they should never have been put in
the ￿rst place."
Unfortunately, core areas of mathematical economics and game theory, with
impeccable orthodox sanction, are replete with even worse false claims and
assertions about constructivity, intuitionism and computability. I choose the
phrase ￿ even worse￿most deliberately. The above inanities, admittedly in a
textbook that may ￿ corrupt￿the mind of fresh and innocent graduate students
in economics, are just that: marginal textbook assertions that may pass ￿with
luck ￿by the average reader without in￿ icting too much damage. It is ￿ even
worse￿in the citadel of mathematical economic theory for the following reason:
what is called computable general equilibrium theory (CGE) forms the foun-
dational core of one frontier of macroeconomic theory: Recursive Competitive
Equilibrium (RCE) which, in turn, forms the basis for the Stochastic Dynamic
General Equilibrium (SDGE) model. The claim in these parts of mathematical
economics is that CGE is computable ￿as is evident even from the appellation
￿ computable￿in CGE ￿ because it is constructive (in the sense of Brouwer).
A representative example of such a claim, made by two distinguished applied
general equilibrium theorists, is the following:
"The major result of postwar mathematical general equilibrium the-
ory has been to demonstrate the existence of such an equilibrium
by showing the applicability of mathematical ￿xed point theorems
to economic models. ... Since applying general equilibrium mod-
els to policy issues involves computing equilibria, these ￿xed point
theorems are important: It is essential to know that an equilibrium
exists for a given model before attempting to compute that equilib-
rium. .....
...
The weakness of such applications is twofold. First, they provide
non-constructive rather than constructive proofs of the existence of
equilibrium; that is, they show that equilibria exist but do not pro-
vide techniques by which equilibria can actually be determined. Sec-
ond, existence per se has no policy signi￿cance. .... Thus, ￿xed point
23See, also, [3], p. 13, ￿ Notes￿ .
24Bishop (op.cit, p. 9), refers to a version of the law of the excluded middle as the principle
of omniscience.
17theorems are only relevant in testing the logical consistency of mod-
els prior to the models￿use in comparative static policy analysis;
such theorems do not provide insights as to how economic behavior
will actually change when policies change. They can only be em-
ployed in this way if they can be made constructive (i.e., be used to
￿nd actual equilibria). The extension of the Brouwer and Kakutani
￿xed point theorems in this direction is what underlies the work of
Scarf .... on ￿xed point algorithms ...."
[51], pp12, 20-1; italics added
But this claim is false, as I have shown rigorously in a series of articles in
respectable applied mathematical Journals (cf., [69], [70]). And it is ￿ even worse￿
because these claims are made in the context of policy models and are used
to justify the derivations of policy propositions, with the accompanying claims
that they are computationally feasible with any prespeci￿ed numerical accuracy.
Even in respectable graduate game theoretic textbooks ([40]), there are claims
about constructible algorithms and constructive proofs that are blatantly false.
A perceptive reader would also notice the schizophrenia exhibited between
￿ proving existence￿and ￿ computing it￿￿i.e., separating the existence problem
from that of a construction. Thus, without batting an eyelid, these two ad-
vocates of the schizophrenia could state that ￿ it is essential to know that an
equilibrium exists .... before attempting to compute that equilibrium.￿ It never
seems to have occurred to them that this separation is precisely the one that is
avoided in constructive mathematics.
Why does orthodoxy get away with such impunity? Why are obvious false-
hoods allowed to persist and perpetuate themselves, quite apart from distorting
alternative methodologies, especially mathematically rigorous ones?
Before I try to forge conjectural answers for these queries, I would like to
return to Brouwer and Bishop ￿but also to Richard von Mises and his valiant
e⁄orts to de￿ne, rigorously, a notion of probability ￿and the way various or-
thodoxies subverted, often by foul means and disgraceful methods, their noble
e⁄orts to challenge the foundations of classical mathematics (and probability
theory) on the basis of impeccably rigorous philosophical, epistemological and,
above all, metamathematical, grounds.
4.2 The Grundlagenkrise ￿Then, Now & Always
"Hilbert￿ s program .... was driven by dual beliefs. On the one
had, Hilbert believed that mathematics must be rooted in human
intuition. ... It meant that intuitively bounded thought (￿nitary
though, he called it) is trustworthy, and that mathematical paradox
can arise only when we exceed those bounds to posit unintuitable
(i.e., in￿nite) objects. For him, ￿nite arithmetic and combinatorics
were the paradigm intuitable parts of mathematics, and thus numer-
ical calculation was the paradigm of ￿nitary thought. All the rest ￿
18set theory, analysis and the like ￿he called the ￿ ideal￿part of mathe-
matics. ..... On the other hand, Hilbert also believed that this ideal
part was sacrosanct. No part of mathematics was to be jettisoned
or even truncated. ￿ No one will expel us.￿ he declared, ￿ from the
paradise into which Cantor has led us￿ 25"
Carl Posy, [45], pp. 294-5; italics added
Summarising the tortuous personal and professional relationship between
Brouwer and Fraenkel, van Dalen ([64], p. 309) concluded that:
"Fraenkel also should be credited for pointing out a curious psy-
chological hypocrisy of Hilbert, who to a large extent adopted the
methodological position of his adversary ￿￿ one could even call [Hilbert]
an intuitionist￿￿([19], p. 154). Although the inner circle of experts
in the area ... had reached the same conclusion from time before, it
was Fraenkel who put it on record."
So, why was there a Grundlagenkrise? Why, in early October, 192826, did
Hilbert write Brouwer as follows:
"Dear Colleague,
Because it is not possible for me to cooperate with you, given the
incompatibility of our views on fundamental matters, I have asked
the members of the board of managing editors of the Mathematische
Annalen for the authorization, which was given to me by Blumenthal
and CarathØodory, to inform you that henceforth we will forgo your
cooperation in the editing of the Annalen and thus delete your name
form the title page. And at the same time I thank you in the name




25The exact quote is as follows, [24], (p. 191):
￿ No one shall drive us out of the paradise which Cantor has created for us.￿
To which the brilliant ￿ Brouwerian￿response, if I may be forgiven for stating it this way, by
Wittgenstein was: [82], (p.103):
￿ I would say, "I wouldn￿ t dream of trying to drive anyone out of this paradise." I
would try to do something quite di⁄erent: I would try to show you that it is not
a paradise ￿so that you￿ ll leave of your own accord. I would say, You￿ re welcome
to this; just look about you." ￿
26I am slightly unsure about the exact date, for which I am relying on [65]. There seems to be
a slight discrepancy in this connection. van Dalen (ibid, p. 599) reports that a telegram from
Erhard Schmidt was delivered to Brouwer on 27 October, 1928, asking him ￿ not to undertake
anything before￿talking to CarathØodory, who was on his way to meet Brouwer. This referred
to two letters, from G￿ttingen, that had already been delivered to Brouwer before the arrival
of CarathØodory, who duly arrived in Laren, where Brouwer was living, on 13 October, 1928.
One or the other dates has to be slightly incorrect!
19This letter27, written at the tail end of the Grundlagenkrise, marked the be-
ginning of the end of it, and silenced Brouwer28 for a decade and a half. Why,
if they were both ￿ intuitionists￿did Hilbert and his ￿ G￿ttinger￿followers, for-
mer students and admirers ￿ silence￿him in this deplorably undemocratic way?
Were they afraid of an open debate on the exact mathematical meaning of intu-
itionism and constructive mathematics? Did they take the trouble to read and
understand Brouwer￿ s deep and penetrating analysis of mathematical thinking
and mathematical processes? There is sad, but clear evidence that Hilbert never
took the trouble to work through, seriously, with the kind of foundational case
Brouwer was making; contrariwise, Brouwer took immense pain and time to
read, work through an understand the foundational stance taken by Hilbert and
his followers.
What were the issues at the centre of the Grundlagenkrise, leaving aside the
personality clashes? As I see it there were three foundational issues, on all of
which I believe Brouwer was eventually vindicated:
￿ The invalidity of the tertium non datur in in￿nitary mathematical rea-
soning;
￿ The problem of Hilbert￿ s Dogma - i.e., ￿ existence , consistency￿vs. the
constructivist credo of ￿ existence as construction￿ , in precisely speci￿ed
ways;
￿ The problem of the continuum - and, therefore, the eventual place of
Brouwer￿ s remarkable introduction of choice sequences, whose time seems
to have come only in recent years;
Carl Posy, re￿ ecting on ￿ Brouwer versus Hilbert: 1907 ￿1928￿([45]), from a
Kantian point of view29 ￿both Brouwer and Hilbert had been deeply in￿ uenced
27This battle between the two protagonists in the Grundlagenkrise, Hilbert and Brouwer,
was referred to as the ￿ Frosch-M￿usekrieg￿by Einstein in his letter to Max Born on 27 No-
vember, 1928. Einstein, who was also a member of the editorial board of the Mathematische
Annalen, did not support Hilbert￿ s unilateral and extraordinary action to remove Brouwer
from the board.
28In van Dalen￿ s poignant description, the once e⁄ervescent, immensely productive, and
active Brouwer ([65], pp. 636-7):
"[F]elt deeply insulted and retired from the ￿eld. He did not give up his math-
ematics, but he simply became invisible. ... Even worse, he gave up publishing
for a decade .. . His withdrawal from the debate did not mean a capitulation,
on the contrary, he was ￿rmly convinced of the soundness and correctness of his
approach."
This is precisely the point of Viscount Morley￿ s wise aphorism, quoted above: ￿ You have
not converted a man because you have silenced him.￿
29
"From the start Hilbert and Brouwer ￿Kantian constructivists both ￿di⁄ered
sharply about the foundations of mathematics. Brouwer was prepared to revise
radically the content and methods of mathematics, while Hilbert￿ s Program was
designed constructively to secure and preserve all of ￿ classical￿ mathematics.
20by Kant, and Hilbert, after all, grew up in K￿nigsberg, which Kant never left!! ￿
summarised the outcome of the Grundlagenkrise in an exceptionally clear way,
as follows (pp. 292-3):
"[Hilbert] won politically. Although a face-saving solution was
found, the dismissal [from the Editorial Board of the Mathematis-
che Annalen] held. Indeed, Brouwer was devastated, and his active
research career e⁄ectively came to an end.
[Hilbert] won mathematically. Classical mathematics remains in-
tact, intuitionistic mathematics was relegated to the margin. ....
.
And [Hilbert] won polemically. Most importantly ... Hilbert￿ s
agenda set the context of the controversy both at the time and,
largely, ever since."
Quite apart from whether Hilbert actually ￿ won￿ , at least on the third front,
￿especially in the light of the subsequent quasi-constructive and partly-intuitive
￿ revolutions￿wrought by recursion theory and non-standard methods ￿there is
also the question of how he won.
To suggest a tentative answer to this question, let me ￿ fast-forward￿forty
years, to the trials and tribulations faced by Errett Bishop who re-constructed
(sic!) large parts of classical mathematics, observing constructive discipline
on the invalidity of the tertium non datur and non-admissibility of ￿ Hilbert￿ s
Dogma￿in his classic and much acclaimed Foundations of Constructive Analysis
([2]). Bishop, too, faced similar personal and professional obstacles to those that
Brouwer and his followers faced ￿although not to the same degree and not from
the kind of o¢ cially formidable adversary like Hilbert. Anil Nerode, George
Metakides and Robert Constable summarise the sadness with which Bishop,
too, felt ￿ silenced￿ , [36], pp. 79-80:
"After the publication of his book Constructive Analysis [in 1967],
Bishop made a tour of the eastern universities.... . He told me
then that he was trying to communicate his viewpoint directly to
the mathematical community, rather than through the logicians. ...
After the eastern tour was over, he said the trip may have been
counterproductive. He felt that his mathematical audience were not
taking the work seriously. ....
After the lecture [at Cornell, during the ￿ tour of the eastern uni-
versities] he mentioned tribulations in the reviewing process when he
submitted the book for publication. He mentioned that one of the
referee￿ s reports said explicitly that it was a disservice to mathemat-
ics to contemplate publication of this book. He could not understand,
and was hurt by such a lack of appreciation of his ideas. ....
Hilbert won."
ibid, p. 292.
Incidentally, Fraenkel￿ s Lectures ([19]) were delivered under the auspices of the Kant-
Gesellschaft, Ortsgruppe Kiel.
21In the next dozen years his students and diciples had a hard time
developing their careers. When they submitted papers developing
parts of mathematics constructively, the classically minded referees
would look at the theorems, and conclude that they already knew
them. They were quite hesitant to accept constructive proofs of
known classical results; whether or not constructive proofs were pre-
viously available. ..... Nowadays, with the interest in computational
mathematics, things might be di⁄erent. Bishop said he ceased to
take students because of these problems. ...
When Bishop was invited to speak to the AMS Summer Institute
on Recursion Theory, he replied that the aggravation caused by the
lecture tour a decade earlier had contributed to a heart attack, and
that he was not willing to take a chance on further aggravation."
What is it about the adherence to the tertium non datur and to ￿ Hilbert￿ s
Dogma￿that makes a whole profession so intolerant? But obviously it is not only
here that intolerance resides. Equally dogmatic, intolerant, voices were raised
against Giuseppe Veronse￿ s, admittedly somewhat less ￿ rigorous￿- at least in
comparison with the works of Brouwer and Bishop ￿pioneering work on the
non-Archimedean continuum. In particular, Veronese￿ s great Italian contempo-
rary, Peano, mercilessly ￿and as intolerantly as Hilbert was against Brouwer
￿criticised and dismissed this work on the non-Archimedean continuum. Gor-
don Fisher, in his masterly summary of ￿ Veronese￿ s Non-Archimedean Linear
Continuum￿ , [18], while acknowledging the ￿ tortured and ungrammatical style￿
of the writing (of a massive book of no less than 630mpages, [67]), noted that
Peano￿ s review of 1892 ([43]) was ￿ especially scathing￿([18], p. 127). Detlef
Laugwitz, who did much to revive non-standard analysis, described the ￿ open
controversy that blazed up￿ , in 1890, ￿ when Veronese announced his use in geom-
etry of in￿nitely large and small quantities￿ , ([31], p. 102). When the German
translation of the 1891 Italian edition appeared in 1894:
"Cantor was doubly irritated. There was another approach to in￿-
nitely large integers; and, moreover, Veronese re-established the in-
￿nitely small which Cantor believed to have proved contradictory."
ibid, pp. 102-3; italics added.
A massive two decade-long campaign against what has since become the
eminently respectable ￿eld of non-standard analysis was launched by many of
the mighty scholars of the foundations of mathematics: Cantor, of course; but,
as mentioned above, also Peano and Russell.
Finally, in this genre of intolerant ponti￿cations ￿that is the only way I
can now describe these so-called foundational criticisms ￿there is also a sad
place to be accorded to the systematic dismissal of Richard von Mises￿ s valiant
attempts to axiomatise the foundations of probability on frequency theoretic
grounds using his highly innovative idea of a place selection function to de￿ne
what he called a ￿ Kollektive￿ . A galaxy of ￿ eminent￿mathematicians, led by
22people like FrØchet and Knopp30, met in Geneva, in 1937, [66], and dismissed
o⁄ hand the von Mises theory, especially in the light of Kolmogorov￿ s measure-
theoretic axomatization of probability ([29]). Ironically, von Mises was strongly
in￿ uenced by Brouwer￿ s development of choice sequences in providing content
for the intuitive continuum, when he came to try to formalise the idea of ￿ lawlike
selections￿ .
It is a particular irony of history that the very same Kolmogorov - together
with Martin-L￿f, Chaitin and Solomonof ￿revived to a splendid research frontier
the idea of algorithmic probability and, in that process, also resurrected to a
new vigour and life the frequency approach to the foundations of probability
([30]. But this is a story that became possible only after computability theory
came into being ￿as a result of the death-knell struck on Hilbert￿ s Program, by
G￿del, Church, Turing and Post. Hilbert may have won a battle ￿ politically,
mathematically and polemically￿ ; but he lost his soul ￿ philosophically and
epistemologically.
It is a sad commentary on the Grundlagenkrise to realise that:
"It is very likely that Hilbert never read Brouwer￿ s basic papers ...
. All of Hilbert￿ s attacks at Brouwer consisted of rather super￿cial
comments on hearsay bits of Brouwer￿ s repertoire. Brouwer, on the
other hand, repeatedly put his ￿nger on the crucial spots of Hilbert￿ s
programme; (1) consistency of induction requires induction .... , (2)
consistency does not prove existence."
[65], p. 637.
Much the same can be said of the experiences faced by Bishop and von Mises.
5 G￿del and Turing ￿Beyond the Grundlagenkrise
and Towards Computability Theory
"It was typical of [Turing] ... to seek to outdo Bell Telephone Labo-
ratories with his single brain, and to build a better system with his
own hands. ... Turing￿ s wording indicates authoritative judgement,
and not the submitting of a proposal for the approval of superiors.
..... As Newman ([37]) put it, Turing was ￿ at heart more an applied
than a pure mathematician￿ . It might be more true to say that Tur-
ing had resisted this Cambridge classi￿cation from the outset. He
attacked every kind of problem ￿from arguing with Wittgenstein,
to the characteristics of electronic components, to the petals of a
daisy. He did so on the basis of immense con￿dence in the power of
mathematical analysis, in whatever ￿eld he chose."
Andrew Hodges, [26], p. 4; italics added
30The latter also played a part on Hilbert￿ s side, against Brouwer in the Grundlagenkrise.
23In 1928 the ￿rst International Congress of Mathematicians since World War
I ￿since, in fact, 1912 ￿was held in the Italian city of Bologna. Since that
tragic war31 German mathematicians had not been invited for international
meetings. Italians, in those heady Fascist ￿ and, yet, pre-Nazi days ￿ were
determined to make the occasion in Bologna truly international and invited the
Germans. Despite opposition by some leading mathematicians in Germany, such
as Bierbach (and by Brouwer), David Hilbert, led a delegation of 67 German
mathematicians to the Bologna congress.
In 1925 and 1927 Hilbert had begun to crystallise his program for the founda-
tions of mathematics in a system which came to be called Formalism, in contrast
to, and in response to, Brouwer￿ s sustained development of Intuitionism as an
alternative foundation for pure mathematics32
Partly as a result of the so-called antinomies of set theory - one of the most
celebrated of which was Russell￿ s paradox of the ￿ set of all sets that do not con-
tain themselves as members￿￿mathematicians at the turn of the 19th century
to the 20th had begun to be more circumspect of arbitrary de￿nitions and un-
trammelled methods of proof. Hilbert, notwithstanding the known antinomies
and the dangers of unconstrained methods of proof, particularly in proving the
existence of a mathematical object as a consequence of not being able to derive
a contradiction in the de￿ning criteria i.e., ￿ Hilbert￿ s Dogma￿ . had seemed to
promote the idea of mathematical formalism as a symbol manipulation game,
with its own rules without any discipline on the nature, contents and structure
of thought. This is the popular view, although it is largely inaccurate.
Brouwer, at a kind of polar opposite end was convinced, in developing the
foundations of mathematics on the basis of intuitionism, that mathematical
objects were the autonomous creations of the human mind, and endeavoured
to discipline the allowable techniques of demonstrating the existence of math-
ematical objects and their de￿nitions in ways that respected the architecture,
philosophy and epistemology of the mind. In this sense there was a direct link
to what came to emerge as recursion theory, but that is not a story I can expand
upon at this point.
The demonstration of the existence of a mathematical object - say even an
abstract one such as the equilibrium price con￿guration of an economy, the
prices at which market supply equals market demand ￿should be accomplished
by constructive methods of proof; i.e., methods that could, in principle, be used
by an ￿ engineer￿actually to construct such an object with ruler, compass, chisel,
31Incidentally, it was the trauma generated by the meaningless slaughter of a whole gen-
eration of mathematicians during that tragic war that led to the philosophy underlying the
formation of the in￿uential French group of mathematicians who called themselves the ￿ Bour-
bakians￿ . Their in￿uence had far reaching consequences even for mathematical economics and
the education of economists at some of the best graduate schools of economics, all over the
World, as a result of the in￿uence of Gerard Debreu, who was himself deeply in￿uenced by
the Bourbakist￿ s vision of mathematical methodology and structure.
32Logicism, the third of the tiresome trilogy, was a foundational system that was essentially
the outcome of the message of the monumental program to reduce mathematics to logic that
was represented in the great three-volume work by Russell and Whitehead. Brouwer, in
contrast, was determined, via Intuitionism, to free mathematics from logic (and language).
24lathe and so on. Thus, to say that a mathematical object exists if the decimal
representation of ￿, say, contains a particular sequence of 9￿ s at a particular
place in the expansion, is to say nothing. Thus, for the formalist mathematician
to claim that even if s/he does not know whether such a statement is true of
the object ￿, God will know, is an equally vacuous assertion.. This kind of
metaphysical answer would bring forth the retorts from Brouwer that he did
not have a pipeline to God and if God had mathematics to do, he can do it
himself; man￿ s mathematics was not necessarily that of God￿ s. In other words,
Brouwer and the Intuitionists would restrict the allowable methods of proof
for mathematicians to those that did not appeal to untrammelled in￿nities,
undecidable disjunctions and so on ￿almost banning magic and metaphysics
from mathematical practice. Strange, then, that Brouwer himself was accused
of ￿ psychologism￿for his belief in the autonomy of the mind and the constructions
of the mind of an ideal mathematician, especially in the context of his work on
choice sequences to provide foundations for the intuitive continuum.
To these Brouwerian objections and constructions, Hilbert (would) reply:
￿ With your [Brouwer￿ s] methods, most of the results of modern mathematics
would have to be abandoned, and to me the important thing is not to get fewer
results but to get more results.￿But why? And at what cost?
By the time of the Bologna meetings of the International Congress of Math-
ematicians, Hilbert had given two lectures33 building towards a ￿nal crystalliza-
tion of his position, such that when formulated as challenges to mathematicians
in the form of well-posed problems, and answers given, debate would forever
be silenced and mathematicians would be allowed to go on with their normal
activities, untrammelled by any kind of constraints by a thought-police of any
sort, however enlightened in method, epistemology or philosophy. Hilbert had
stated his credo, not only by his outstanding mathematical works as examples
of the philosophy he was advocating ￿as, indeed, was the case with Brouwer
￿but also by explicitly stating in his in￿ uential address to the Paris Interna-
tional Congress of Mathematicians in August, 1900, titled famously and simply:
Mathematical Problems ([23], p.444, italics in the original):
￿[T]he conviction (which every mathematician shares, but which
no one has as yet supported by a proof) that every de￿nite mathe-
matical problem must necessarily be susceptible of an exact settle-
ment, either in the form of an actual answer to the question asked,
or by the proof of the impossibility of its solution and therewith the
necessity failure of all attempts. .....
Is this axiom of the solvability of every problem a peculiarity
characteristic of mathematical thought alone, or is it possibly a gen-
eral law inherent in the nature of the mind, that all questions which
it asks must be answerable? For in other sciences also one meets old
33The ￿rst, titled: On the In￿nite, was delivered in M￿nster on 4 June, 1925 at a meeting
organised by the Westphalen Mathematical Society to honour the memory of Karl Weierstrass,
the quintessential formalist, The second was titled: The Foundations of Mathematics and
delivered in July 1927 at the Hamburg Mathematical Seminar.
25problems which have been settled in a manner most satisfactory and
most useful to science by the proof of their impossibility. ....
This conviction of the solvability of every mathematical problem
is a powerful incentive to the worker. We hear within us the perpet-
ual call: There is the problem. Seek its solution. You can ￿nd it by
pure reason, for in mathematics there is no ignoramibus.￿
Even as far back as 1900, in that same famous lecture, Hilbert had also
stated34, clearly and unambiguously, the acceptable criteria for the ￿ solution of
a mathematical problem￿ :
￿[I]t shall be possible to establish the correctness of the solution
by means of a ￿nite number of steps based upon a ￿nite number
of hypotheses which are implied in the statement of the problem
and which must always be exactly formulated. This requirement of
logical deduction by means of a ￿nite number of processes is simply
the requirement of rigour in reasoning.￿
ibid, p. 409.
These were the methodological and epistemological backdrops against which,
in Bologna in 1928, Hilbert threw down the gauntlet to his foundational detrac-
tors, in the clear conviction that the answers to the questions he was posing
would be forthcoming ￿surely, also, to substantiate his own philosophy of math-
ematics:
￿ Is mathematics complete ￿in the sense that every mathematical statement
could be rigorously ￿rigour interpreted in the above ￿nitary sense ￿proved
or disproved;
￿ Is mathematics consistent ￿in the sense that it should not be possible to
derive, by valid proof procedures, again in the sense of ￿nitary rigorous
proof stated above, universally false mathematical statements within a
formal mathematical system;
￿ Is mathematics decidable ￿in the sense of using a de￿nite ￿nitary method,
it was possible to demonstrate the truth ￿or falsity, as the case may be ￿
of a mathematical assertion.
On 8 September 1930 Hilbert gave the opening address to the German So-
ciety of Scientists and Physicians, in K￿nigsberg35, titled: Naturkennen und
Logik. This lecture ended famously echoing those feelings and beliefs he had
expressed in Paris, thirty years earlier, [12], p. 71 (italics added):
34Hilbert￿ s vision of the solvability of mathematical problems, and criteria for solvability,
were interpreted by Brouwer, correctly in my opinion, as a way of unconditionally accepting
the untrammeled validity of the tertium non datur.
35Where he was also honoured, in those enlightened pre-Nazi days, by being presented, by
the K￿nigsberg Town Council, with an ￿ honorary citizenship￿ .
26￿For the mathematician there is no Ignoramibus and, in my opin-
ion, not at all for natural science either. ... The true reason why
[no one] has succeeded in ￿nding an unsolvable problem is, in my
opinion, there is no unsolvable problem. In contrast to the foolish
Ignoramibus, our credo avers:
We must know,
We shall know.￿ 36
A day before that, on Sunday, 7th September, 1930, at the Roundtable Dis-
cussion on the ￿nal day of the Conference on Epistemology of the Exact Sciences,
organised by the Gesellschaft f￿r Empirische Philosophie, a Berlin Society al-
lied to the Wiener Kreis, the young Kurt G￿del had presented what came to
be called his First Incompleteness Theorem. In fact, in one fell swoop, G￿del
had shown that it was recursively demonstrable that in the formal system of
classical mathematics, assuming it was consistent, there were true but unprov-
able statements ￿i.e., incompleteness and, almost as a corollary to this famous
result, also that mathematics was inconsistent37. Two of the pillars on which
Hilbert was hoping to justify formalism had been shattered.
There remained the third: Decidability. The problem of resolving this ques-
tion depended on ￿nding an acceptable ￿ to the mathematician, metamath-
ematician and the mathematical philosopher ￿ de￿nition of de￿nite ￿nitary
method. In one of the celebrated con￿ uences and simultaneous discoveries that
the history of science and mathematics seems to be littered with, Alan Turing
and Alonzo Church came up with de￿nitions that, ex post, came to be accepted
by mathematicians, logicians, etc., as encapsulating the intuitive notion of def-
inite ￿nitary method, now routinely referred to as ￿ algorithms￿ .
Once this was done, the unadulterated genius of Alan Turing devised, en-
tirely with the aim of answering the question of decidability posed by Hilbert,
the now celebrated Turing Machine, ([62]).
Thus came to an end Hilbert￿ s pyrrhic victory over Brouwer; thus will come
to an end the sustained hostility to Bishop￿ s constructivism - whilst Veronese
has already been copiously vindicated, although many generations after his own
lifetime.
The development of computability theory is, in a strong sense, an outgrowth
of the Grundlagenkrise. In many ways it stands, as an epistemology and a
mathematical philosophy, midway between pure Intuitionistic Constructivism
and Hilbert￿ s kind of formalism. For example, the tertium non datur is freely
invoked in recursion theory. Hence it is quite possible to prove the existence of
algorithms to solve well-posed mathematical problems with almost no hope of
36The marker that was placed over Hilbert￿ s grave in G￿ttingen had etched on it the German
original of these last two lines:
￿Wir m￿ssen wissen.
Wir werden wissen.￿
37This result, in its full formal version, is known as G￿del￿ s Second Incompleteness Theorem:
the consistency of a mathematical system cannot be proved within that system
itself.
27ever constructing them for implementation ￿or, at least, not knowing whether
it can or cannot be done: i.e., undecidable.
Above all, there is one basic di⁄erence between recursion theory (computabil-
ity theory) and constructive mathematics (especially of the Brouwer-Bishop
variety): in the former the cardinal disciplining precept is the Church-Turing
Thesis; this is not accepted in the Brouwer-Bishop variant of constructive math-
ematics. Why not? I think an answer can be found along the lines suggested
by Troelstra ([61], pp. 3-4):
"Should we accept the intuitionistic form of Church￿ s thesis, i.e., the
statement
￿ Every lawlike function is recursive￿?
There are two reasons for abstaining from the identiti￿cation ￿ lawlike
= recursive￿ :
(i) An axiomatic reason: ... [A]ssuming recursiveness means carrying
unnecessary information around. In the formal development, there
are many possible interpretations for the range of the variables for
lawlike sequences .... .
(ii) A second reason is ￿ philosophical￿ : the (known) informal jus-
ti￿cations of ￿ Church￿ s thesis￿ all go back to Turing￿ s conceptual
analysis (or proceed along similar lines).
Turing￿ s analysis strikes me as providing very convincing arguments
for identifying ￿ mechanically computable￿ with ￿ recursive￿ , but as
to the identi￿cation of ￿ humanly computable￿with ￿ recursive￿ , extra
assumptions are necessary which are certainly not obviously implicit
in the intuitionistic (languageless) approach ... "
The path opened up by the foundational results of G￿del, Church, Turing
and Post, made obsolete Hilbert￿ s Program, without completely resolving the
ambiguities surrounding ￿ Hilbert￿ s Dogma￿ . I suspect, in view of G￿del￿ s epis-
temology and his metamathematical results, we will forever remain unable to
resolve its status unambiguously ￿also because Brouwer and the Brouwerians,
as well as non-Intuitionistic Constructivists like Bishop, refuse to compromise
with logic and language.
The extent to which Hilbert was wedded to his mathematical ideology can
be gauged from the fact that those who were close to Hilbert ￿ shilded￿him from
G￿del￿ s remarkable results, presented at the very meeting where Hilbert had
enunciated yet another of his paens to the Hilbert Program and to Hilbert￿ s
Dogma. He - Hilbert - came to hear of G￿del￿ s K￿nigsberg results ￿ only months
later￿and ￿ when he learnt about G￿del￿ s work, he was angry.￿ 38
38As reported in [65], p. 638, and van Dalen goes on, p.639 (ibid):
"G￿del￿ s incompleteness theorems brought the second ending of the Grundla-
genstreit. Where Hilbert had won the con￿ict in the social sense, he had lost it
in the scienti￿c sense."
28In an even greater twist of fate ￿or what may felicitously be re⁄erred to as a
noble unintended consequence of dogma ￿Veronese was resurrected (implicitly)
by an invoking of G￿del￿ s incompleteness results:
"For a long time the incompleteness of axiomatic systems was re-
garded by mathematicians as unfortunate. It was the genius of
Abraham Robinson, in the early sixties, to turn it to good use and
show that thnks to it a vast simpli￿cation of mathematical reasoning
can be achieved."
Nelson ([35]), p. 15
The icing on this twisted cake was the award of the second Brouwer Medal,
in March, 1973, to Abraham Robinson!39
Should we not applaud these wonderful unintended consequences of the
cracks in dogmas?
I would like to end this section with a counterfactual thought: suppose
Hilbert had not ￿ thrown down the gauntlet￿and challenged mathematicians and
mathematical philosophers to resolve, by ￿nitary means, the triptych of com-
pleteness, consistency and decidability, would the genius of a G￿del, the innocent
brilliance of a Turing, or the deep speculations of a Church have concentrated
on the extraordinary work that led to the emergence of recursion theory? Con-
noisseurs of the foundations of mathematics may, of course, be able to say that
Post￿ s work in his doctoral dissertation ([44]) and Skolem ([54]) would, in good
time, have been (re-)discovered and the mathematical foundations of computer
science could have been erected on similar foundations. Others, like myself, like
to think that a recursion theory more ￿nessed and attuned to the strictures of
constructive mathematics may have become the foundations of computer sci-
ence. Either way, eventually, Hilbert￿ s victory ￿at least in some senses ￿proved
to be, and would have proven to be, pyrrhic.
6 Harvesting the Lessons, Weaving a Pattern
"In the end we search out the beginnings. ...
Genius will out, but how and why and what serves to nurture it?
What consonance is there with the personality, what determines
the particular channels taken by the intellect and the distinctive
character of what is achieved?"
39In his Brouwer Lecture, on the occasion he received the Brouwer Medal, he paid handsome
tribute to Brouwer, Intuitionism and the key di⁄erence between invention and discovery in
mathematics, [11], p. 461:
"Brouwer￿ s intuitionism is closely related to his conception of mathematics as
a dynamic activity of the human intellect rather than the discovery of an im-
mutable abstract universe. This is a conception for which I have some sympathy
and which, I believe, is acceptable to many mathematicians who are not intu-
itionists."
29Solomon Feferman, [16], p. 2.
In economics we expect self appointed Commissars of varieties of ideologies
to act as gate keepers, censoring or approving access to the gates of plenty, at the
expense of visions and freedom of thought. It is not seldom we hear the phrase
self-censorship in departments of economics aspiring to climb the rungs of o¢ cial
reputation, as measured by counters of orthodox bibliometric criteria. Graduate
students are nurtured, implicitly and explicitly, on the nature of research that
would mean anything for promotion, funding and research facilities.
That such a state of a⁄airs has persisited in the purest recesses of mathemat-
ics ￿at its deepest levels of foundational research ￿came as a complete surprise
to me. I embarked on trying to understand the status of proof in mathematical
economics and the role of computation in applied economics and emerged with
perplexities beyond explicabilities, initially. But with hindsight, and re￿ ections
on a particular episode in economic theory, it became possible for me to interpret
the events I have tried to describe, however brie￿ y, above.
Piero Sra⁄a￿ s elegant, terse, Production of Commodities by Means of Com-
modities, ([57]; henceforth, PCC), has, in its 50th anniversary year of publica-
tion, reached the status of a classic: viz, often quoted, rarely read (although in
this case it may also be the case that it is even more rarely read)40. From a
purely mathematical point of view, PCC lacks nothing. The concerns in PCC
are the solvability of equation systems and, whenever existence or uniqueness
proofs are considered, they are either spelled out in completeness, albeit from
a non-formal, non-classical, point of view or detailed hints are given, usually in
the form of examples, to complete the necessary proofs in required generalities.
Standard economic theory, on the other hand, is naturally formalized in terms
of inequalities. A case can even be made that this is so that ￿x-point theorems
can easily be applied to prove the existence of equilibria. A case made elegantly
by Steve Smale:
"We return to the subject of equilibrium theory. The existence
theory of the static approach is deeply rooted to the use of the
mathematics of ￿xed point theory. Thus one step in the libera-
tion from the static point of view would be to use a mathematics
of a di⁄erent kind. Furthermore, proofs of ￿xed point theorems
traditionally use di¢ cult ideas of algebraic topology, and this has
obscured the economic phenomena underlying the existence of equi-
libria. Also the economic equilibrium problem presents itself most
directly and with the most tradition not as a ￿xed point problem,
but as an equation, supply equals demand. Mathematical econo-
40In a letter to Piero Sra⁄a, dated 3 September 1960, Sir John Hicks wrote to Sra⁄a,
referring to [57]:
"Economic theory (teachable economic theory, at least) was getting just a bit
boring lately; for the second time in your life you have livened it up again. Thank
you."
30mists have translated the problem of solving this equation
into a ￿xed point problem.
I think it is fair to say that for the main existence problems
in the theory of economic equilibrium, one can now bypass the
￿xed point approach and attack the equations directly to
give existence of solutions, with a simpler kind of mathe-
matics and even mathematics with dynamic and algorithmic
overtones."
[55], p.290; bold emphasis added.
Sra⁄a, in PCC, ￿ bypassed the ￿xed point approach and attacked the equa-
tions directly to give existence of solutions, with a simpler kind of mathematics￿ ,
one with ￿ algorithmic overtones￿- essentially by relying on ￿ existence as con-
struction￿ , rather than appealing to Hilbert￿ s Dogma. One of the ￿nest scholars
of classical economic theory, who was also an accomplished master of mathe-
matical economics, Sukhamoy Chakravarty, summarised one aspect of Sra⁄a￿ s
mathematical method with complete ￿delity:
"Sra⁄a￿ s austere prose of Production of Commodities by Means of
Commodities can prove more daunting to most students of economics
than the use of matrix algebra. In recent years, an increasing number
of textbooks have, therefore, made liberal use of the basic tools of
linear algebra, including some results on non-negative square matri-
ces to derive the analytical results which Sra⁄a largely demonstrates
constructively with the help of English prose."
Chakravarty ([10], p.122; second set of italics, added)
For over thirty years I have been making the case for proving one of these
famous theorems on non-negative square matrices ￿in particular the Perron-
Frobenius theorems ￿ using the constructive framework Sra⁄a has provided,
rather than the other way about. There are gradual stirrings and hints that
some devotees of Sra¢ an economics may have begin to think along these lines,
although they are ￿so far as I have been able to gauge ￿entirely unversed in
serious constructive analysis (or even computable analysis).
Instead of reading Sra⁄a￿ s book directly, most mathematically minded econo-
mists read it with a background in classical mathematical economics. In a rep-
etition of the fate that befell Bishop and his students, at the hands of journal
referees who were unable to see beyond the methods of classical mathematical
economics, Sra⁄a￿ s book, and its mathematics, was condemned to mathemati-
cal oblivion simply because familiar notation, orthodox mathematical tools and
standard proof techniques were not harnessed by him, in deriving his impecca-
bly rigorous results. Thus, the profession simply recast the economics of PCC
in the mathematics of linear algebra and proceeded to assure itself, as in the
gratuitous words of a leading exponent of this genre, Frank Hahn ([21], p.353):
"Sra⁄a￿ s book contains no formal propositions which I consider to
31be wrong ....."41
The simplest of examples of how he and legions of others satis￿ed themselves
that PCC ￿ contains no formal propositions [that they] consider to be wrong￿can
be given by taking one of Hahn￿ s own renderings of a ￿ formal proposition￿ , os-
tensibly from PCC. According to Hahn￿ s reading of PCC, Sra⁄a in PCC, when
constructing the standard system, is looking for a positive vector x￿ and a (posi-
tive) scalar G￿ such that the following vector-matrix equation is satis￿ed(op.cit,
p.355)42:
x￿ = G￿Ax￿ (1)
where the n ￿ n matrix A consists of elements aij > 0;i;j = 1;:::;n
It is at this point that the usual ￿ distortion￿and misreading of PCC enters
the fray. Having formulated the problem of the construction of the standard
system as one of ￿nding particular eigenvalues and eigenvectors of a system of
linear equations, Hahn goes on to claim, with almost dismissive disdain (ibid):
"We now have a purely mathematical problem for which there is a
standard mathematical result. ... The [vector x￿] is a pure construct
as of course is [1] used in its derivation."
He even helps the reader by referring to the appendix in his own book (writ-
ten jointly with Arrow, but he refers to the wrong appendix) for the ￿ standard
mathematical result￿ . He does not, of course, tell us in the article or in the
appendix of the book with Arrow, what assumptions were needed to prove the
mathematical result he invokes. Nor does he add any caveat on the care with
which PCC avoids any matrix formalizations. Above all, he does not warn the
reader that (1) is not used in the derivation of the construction of x￿ in PCC.
To be more precise, we are not informed, either in the above article by Hahn
or in the book with Arrow to which he refers for ￿ the mathematical result￿ , of
the assumptions, frameworks and the methods of proof used in the derivation of
those results. Perhaps they were derived by hand-waving or undecidable disjunc-
tions. In fact, the Perron-Frobenius theorems are generally proved by an appeal
to the Brouwer ￿xed point theorem (although there are other ways to prove
them, too) where, at a crucial stage of its proof, as pointed out above, appeal
41The completion of the sentence reads: ￿ ...although here and there it contains remarks
which I think to be false￿ . (ibid, p.353). This is, in my opinion, a statement that is not easy
to substantiate about ￿ remarks￿in a rigorous book, where there is not a single categorical
statement - as remarks or in any other form whatsoever - without rock solid logical underpin-
nings. There are, of course, suggestions, with impeccable caveats - the prime example being
the famous one to end the penultimate paragraph of p.33 in PCC:
"The rate of pro￿t, as a ratio, has a signi￿cance which is independent of any prices,
and can well be ￿ given￿before the prices are ￿xed. It is accordingly susceptible
of being determined from outside the system of production, in particular by the
level of the money rates of interest." (italics added)
42Not all of the assumptions in Hahn￿ s rendering are faithful to the economics of PCC, in
particular the assumption of a strictly positive A; but let that pass.
32is made to the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem, which is provably impossible to
constructivise. Whether Sra⁄a was aware of this particular infelicity in deriving
the ￿ mathematical result￿which Hahn and others wave with a ￿ ourish whenever
they mention the standard system and its construction is not the issue. The
point really is that uncritical appeal to standard mathematical results means
the mathematical and logical baggage underpinning it comes with it and could
make a mockery of the economic rationale for the result and, most importantly,
for the way its validity is demonstrated - i.e., proved.
Richard Quandt￿ review of PCC (op.cit), is slightly more explicit about
appealing to the Brouwer ￿xed-point theorem - so beloved of the mathematical
economists and the game theorists, but the curse of the constructivists and the
intuitionists, with Brouwer himself leading the curse from the front43:
"The existence of positive prices and the uniqueness of the stan-
dard system is proved. One feels that the existence proof would,
under somewhat di⁄erent assumptions, be amenable to a ￿xed point
argument. In particular, if the price vector were required to be non-
negative only, the Brouwer Fixed Point Theorem might be utilized."
[46], p.500
One cannot help wondering why, if ￿ existence .. and uniqueness of the
standard system is proved￿ , there is any need to make ￿ di⁄erent assumptions￿
just so as to make it possible to use ￿ a ￿xed point argument￿? Was PCC an
exercise in teaching or exhibiting the use of alternative ￿ mathematical results￿
and ￿ theorems￿? For that purpose one can turn to the great and good mathe-
matics texts themselves. Moreover, even ￿ if the price vector were required to
be non-negative￿ , it is entirely feasible to prove its existence by means of wholly
constructive methods, without any invoking of the intrinsically non-constructive
Brouwer Fixed Point Theorem.
Burmeister ([9]) traverses the same worn out path, a little more explicitly
than Hahn and Quandt - and a thousand others - so that it might be useful to
have him state his case, too:
"In Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities Mr Sra⁄a
demonstrates that there exists a ￿ Standard System￿ .... . [A]pparently
it is not widely recognized that the proposition can be easily estab-
lished from well-known theorems in linear algebra. Here a straight-
forward proof is given; it circumvents much of Mr Sra⁄a￿ s discussion
in chapters III, IV and V, and hopefully will be enlightening to the
mathematical economist."
[9] p. 83.
43Obviously Professor Quandt does not realise that any appeal to the standard version of
the Brouwer Fixed Point Theorem means also an appeal to the Bolzano-Weierstrass Theorem.
This latter theorem, because of its intrinsic reliance on undecidable disjunctions, cannot be
constructi￿ed by anything less than pure magic - a fact recognized by Brouwer quite soon after
he had enunciated it and, therefore, rejected it. See the discussions in the earlier sections of
this paper.
33More importantly, what was the advantage in ￿ circumventing Mr Sra⁄a￿ s
discussion in chapters III, IV and V￿? And how will it be ￿ enlightening to the
mathematical economist￿to establish the same propositions demonstrated by a
faultless and innovative logic of mathematics by Sra⁄a ￿ from well-known theo-
rems of linear algebra￿? Surely, a competent mathematical economist would be
curious to learn new methods of proof rather than simply rehash ￿ well-known
theorems in linear algebra￿? Or is Professor Burmeister suggesting that the eco-
nomic propositions in PCC are so important and innovative that establishing
them - of course without violating the assumptions in PCC - with the more
familiar mathematics of the mathematical economist might serve a higher pur-
pose? But that, too, will not make sense - because the economics of PCC
is inextricably intertwined with the mathematical methods devised for prov-
ing the propositions on existence and uniqueness and ￿ circumventing￿the three
mentioned chapters would be like removing the good Prince of Denmark from
that tragic drama played out in Elsinore.
The same drama played out in the foundations of mathematics, epoch after
epoch, was repeated in the purest parts of economic theory ￿but to that tale
was added an ideological twist, at least in my opinion. By declaring that Sra⁄a￿ s
mathematical method was less than rigorous and, moreover, that it was only a
special case of the framework developed by von Neumann ([74]), the important
economic message in the book was e⁄ectively subverted. Similar to the way the
classically trained mathematician, refereeing the works by Bishop and his stu-
dents, could not understand the point of ￿ re-proving￿classically derived results,
the less than competent mathematical economist reduced PCC to a special case
of this or that version of some orthodox version of economic theory.
This kind of insidious thought censorship, by self appointed Commissars of
correct thinking, plague not only the foundations of mathematics. They are
alive and well in economics ￿and I guess in evey domain of the pure sciences
and in the theoretical recesses of every kind of academic discipline. Unless and
until we unshackle ourselves from the perceptive Thorkildian aphorism, we will
remain intellectual neanderthals.
34A A Personal Nonstandard Odyssey
"The very ￿rst model of nonstandard analysis, due to Schmieden
and Laugwitz ([49]), was in fact completely constructive. ... We
emphasise that the development [in this paper] is done in compliance
with Bishop￿ s strict constructivism ([2]), and that it may indeed be
formalised within Martin-L￿f￿ s type theory [see, for example, [38]],
which will be the o¢ cial metatheory in case of doubt. Thus it is in
principle possible to extract algorithms from all the existence results
we establish."
[41], p. 233, 235; italics added.
Just to make my position on the role, indeed the importance of non-standard
analysis, in computable economics clear, I shall quote an early stance I took on
this important issue. In [68], I pointed out (footnote 1, p. 587):
Although it may appear paradoxical, I am of the opinion that
non-standard analysis should be placed squarely in the constructive
tradition - at least from the point of view of practice. Ever since
Leibniz chose a notation for the di⁄erential and integral calculus
that was conducive to computation, a notation that has survived
even in the quintessentially non-computational tradition of classi-
cal real analysis, the practice of non-standard analysis has remained
￿rmly rooted in applicability from a computational point of view.
Indeed, the ￿rst modern rejuvenation of the non-standard tradition
in the late 50s and early 60s, at the hands of Schmieden and Laug-
witz (cf. [49]), had constructive underpinnings. I add the caveat
￿ modern￿because Veronese￿ s sterling e⁄orts (cf.[67]) at the turn of
the 19th century did not succeed in revitalising the subject due to its
unfair dismissal by Peano and Russell, from di⁄erent points of view.
The former dismissed it, explicitly, for lacking in ￿ rigour￿ ; the latter,
implicitly, by claiming that the triple problems of the in￿nitesimal,
in￿nity and the continuum had been ￿ solved￿ .
However, I have not made - as yet - a sustained case for non-standard analytic
computable economics. The reason is that I have not been able to come to terms
with the full philosophical and epistemological force of the L￿wenheim-Skolem
theorem and the Skolem paradox44. Skolem gave two proofs of what is now
44For the absolute novice, a loose statement of the L￿wenheim-Skolem theorem goes some-
thing like this: Every formal system expressed in the ￿rst order functional calculus has a de-
numerable model. The Skolem paradox, on the other hand, although not a ￿ genuine￿paradox
in the same sense of the other logical antinomies, is also philosophically and epistemologically
disturbing. Again, informally phrased, the Skolem paradox states that there is a ￿rst order
theory, such that if it has an intended model, it has both a countable and an uncountable
model. Hunter ([27], Part Three ), is a reasonably clear and accessible reference to a formal
approach to these important issues. Shapiro ([50]), on the other hand, has a clear, albeit
concise, discussion of the paradoxical implications of the theorem and the paradox. The rig-
orous versions of the theorem and the paradox, together with a characteristically illuminating
discussion, can be found in the Kleene ￿ classic￿ ([28], especially, pp. 425-7).
35called the L￿wenheim-Skolem theorem, one in 1920, where he used the axiom
of choice and, later, in 1922, without the axiom of choice. He concluded the
beautiful 1922 Lecture45 with an observation that is of particular relevance for
the way I believe algorithmic mathematical economics should be formalized.
viz., without any reliance or foundations in set theory (in particular, ZFC):
"....I believed that it was so clear that axiomatization in terms
of sets was not a satisfactory ultimate foundation of mathematics,
that mathematicians would, for the most part, not be very much
concerned with it. But in recent times I have seen to my surprise
that so many mathematicians think that these axioms of set theory
provide the ideal foundation for mathematics; therefore it seemed to
me that the time had come to publish a critique. "
[53], pp. 300-1; italics added.
It was not that Skolem was sceptical about the need for ￿and the possibility
of ￿foundations for mathematics; but he desired it to be ￿ recursive￿ , possibly
based on inductive de￿nitions ￿he did not think the foundations could be found,
or should be sought, in axiomatic set theory. Orthodox mathematical economics
￿even when using non-standard analysis ￿seems to pride itself in the fact that
the mathematics it uses is founded on ZFC.
I have not had time to sort these issues in a clear and simple way, so far, but
hope to come to a view in the near future. Till, then, I have con￿ned myself
to using non-standard analysis in bridging the gap between the use of ad hoc
discontinuities in standard nonlinear dynamics and rigorous continuity in non-
standard analysis, using in￿nitesimals imaginatively, even on digital computers.
Related to this is my particular personal satisfaction to note that the non-
standard proof of Peanos￿existence theorem for ODE￿ s avoids the use of the
Ascoli lemma. In [71], chapter 1, I mentioned the non-constructive nature of the
Ascoli lemma and its suspicious use in the standard proof of Peano￿ s existence
theorem for ODEs 46.
I would like to take this opportunity to add a very ￿ personal note￿on the
way I came to become familiar with non-standard analysis, particularly because
mathematical economists seem to think the revival of the noble tradition of
in￿nitesimals owes everything to Abraham Robinson￿ s undoubtedly signi￿cant
contributions. Moreover, very few mathematical economists can even imagine
that the in￿nitesimals of non-standard analysis make it possible to dispel with
the ad-hoc discontinuities even in so-called rigorous non-linear dynamics, via re-
laxation oscillations (see [72] on the non-standard analysis of the existence (sic!)
of multiple limit cycles in the van der Pol equation, ubiquitous in endogenous
business cycle theories).
Economists routinely reason in terms of in￿nitesimals, without, of course,
realizing it. Every time mathematical economists cavalierly invoke ￿ price taking￿
45Delivered to the Fifth Congress of Scandinavian Mathematicians, held in Helsinki, in
August, 1922.
46The elegant exposition of the non-standard proof is given on pp. 30-1, Theorem 1.5.1, in
[1].
36behaviour due to the insigni￿cance of individual agents in a perfectly compet-
itive market, they are invoking poor old Archimedes, too. My own realization
of his immanent presence in the mathematics I was using came about entirely
accidentally, but felicitously.
A completely accidental ￿nd, at a Cambridge antiquarian bookshop, of Max
Newman￿ s copy of Hobson￿ s classic text on real analysis, [25], during what turned
out, subsequently, to be a melancholy visit to that city in late 1977, was the
beginning of my initiation into non-Archimedean mathematics. It so happened
that I was spending that academic year as a Research Fellow at C.O.R.E, in
Louvain-La-Neuve and my neighbouring o¢ ce was occupied by Robert Aumann.
I found Hobson￿ s book eminently readable ￿all 770 pages of it, in that ￿rst edi-
tion format I was reading; it later expanded into double that size in later edi-
tions. However I was perplexed by the fact, clearly pointed out in the book, that
Hobson referred to Giuseppe Veronese as the modern ￿ resurrector￿of the older
Leibniz-Newton notion of in￿nitesimals and his ￿Veronese￿ s ￿development of a
calculus devoid of the Archimedean assumption, ([25], pp.54-6). The perplexity
was, of course, that none of the historical allusions47 to the founding fathers of
nonstandard analysis even remotely referred to Veronese as one of them. There
were the great originators: Leibniz and Newton; then there was the great res-
urrection by Skolem; and, ￿nally, the ￿ quantum￿jump to Abraham Robinson.
Neither Peirce, nor Veronese, both of whom explicitly and cogently denied the
Archimedean axiom in their development of analysis, were ever referred to, at
least in the ￿ standard￿texts on nonstandard analysis.
Aumann, who had done much to make continuum analysis of price taking
behaviour rigorous in mathematical economics was my neighbour. One morning
I dropped by at his o¢ ce and showed him the pages in Hobson￿ s book, referring
to Veronese￿ s nonstandard analysis, and asked him whether it was not a proper
precursor to Abraham Robinson￿ s work and a clear successor to Leibniz and
Newton, at least with respect to in￿nitesimals and the (non-) Archimedean
axioms? He promised to read it carefully, borrowed my book, and disappeared,
as he usually did, on a Friday. He returned on the following Monday, gave me
back my copy of Hobson with a cryptic, but unambiguous, remark: ￿ Yes, indeed,
this work by Veronese appears to be a precursor to Abraham Robinson￿ .
Why had Veronese￿ s modern classic, [67], ￿ disappeared￿from orthodox his-
tories of nonstandard analysis, at least at that time? Some rummaging through
the historical status of Veronese￿ s work on non-Archimedean analysis, particu-
larly in Italy, gave me a clue as to what had happened. It was Veronese￿ s mis-
fortune to have published his work on nonstandard analysis just as his slightly
younger great Italian mathematical contemporary, Giuseppe Peano, was begin-
ning his successful crusade to consolidate the movement to make standard real
analysis rigorous. Veronese￿ s book was severely criticised48 for falling foul of
47I did not, at that time (1977), know of the work of Ehrlich, ([14]), and others, which came
out, in any case, much later.
48See, in particular, Peano￿ s ￿ open letter￿ to Veronese, [42], in the very ￿rst volume of
the Journal Peano founded in 1891, Rivista di Matematica. I may add that my interest,
as a Trento economist, has a regional patriotic ￿avour in favour of Veronese. He was from
37the emerging orthodox standards of ￿ rigour￿and fell o⁄ the backs of the o¢ cial
mathematical community like water o⁄ of a duck￿ s back. If only they knew
what nonstandard ducks would eventually be shown to be capable of, just in
the study of the van der Pol equation alone(see [72])!
Chioggia, ￿ here￿in the Northeast of Italy; Peano was from, Spinetta, near Cuneo, at the other
end of the horizontal divide of Italy, the Northwest!
38B Homage to Brouwer
On the Shoulders of Kant, Husserl, G￿del and Turing
From the Maya to the Vedas,




Brahma￿ s intuitive creators.
Unfolding sequences





For Shiva to dance
The constructive destruction
The cycle repeats
Hilbert, too, came and went.
The search for foundations
Ever renewed,
Always a chimera
Only Nagarjuna￿ s sunya remains.
Vela Velupillai
Christmas day, 2007
Revised, September 11, 2010
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